I. Introduction
In the absence of consistent State practice, State succession in respect of treaties has long been a rather uncertain field of international law. 2 Meanwhile, scholars involved in the drafting of these instruments readily acknowledged that these standards were very open to criticism. 3 One of the foremost authorities on the subject even observed that 'State succession is a subject altogether unsuited to the process of codification.
14 As a result of the collapse of the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia during the early 1990s, and the planned transfer of sovereignty over Hong Kong in 1997, the situation has now radically changed. State practice on sucession to international treaties involving 23-odd successor States has suddenly become extremely vibrant. Fundamental questions that were until recently debated only among a limited circle of scholars have been brought into the political arena. Now that the dust has settled somewhat, the time seems ripe to try and draw some conclusions from this outburst of international activity. In particular, it now seems time to face the question of whether the standards included in instruments such as the Vienna Convention and the Restatement (Third) accurately reflect customary international law.
Within the wider area of State succession, the subject of State succession in respect of human rights treaties is of particular interest. From a policy point of view, its importance lies in the fact that massive human rights violations often occur precisely during the periods of political instability which tend to accompany State succession. In such circumstances there is an urgent need to know the precise extent of the international obligations which are incumbent on the successor State. This applies not only to the primary obligations (the international human rights standards which are in force) but also to the secondary obligations (the reporting obligations, the complaints procedures and, more generally, the rules of accountability). From a scholarly point of view, the importance of the subject of State succession in respect of human rights treaties lies in the fact that there is an above average amount of State practice in this area. This is because of the interaction which can frequently be observed between States, political organs of international organizations, and the supervisory bodies established under the relevant human rights treaties. Conclusions about the law as it stands can therefore be drawn with more confidence than with respect to other categories of treaties.
The key question explored in this article is whether a successor State is bound by the obligations contained in international human rights instruments that were binding on the predecessor State or whether it is free to accept or not to accept those obligations. This question is considered both from the point of view of die international community and from the point of view of successor States themselves. After some introductory remarks about the system of the Vienna Convention and the special character of human rights treaties, the article first examines the attitude adopted by international organizations and treaty monitoring bodies. It then analyzes the attitude towards human rights treaties adopted by the successor States. While the emphasis is on human rights treaties stricto sensu reference will also be made to humanitarian treaties in a wider sense, i.e. treaties on international humanitarian law and international labour law.
II. The Vienna Convention Regime
The leading attempt to codify and progressively develop the international law concerning State succession in respect of treaties is the 1978 Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties. 5 Most of this Convention, however, is devoted to the position of the newly independent State. This concept is defined as 'a successor State the territory of which immediately before the succession of States was a dependent territory for the international relations of which the predecessor 5 Supra note 1.
was responsible.' 6 The Convention offers only little guidance to a successor State which is not newly independent. This is, of course, ironic because by the time the Convention was adopted there were hardly any dependent territories left that could be considered as potential candidates for the status of newly independent State.
The distinction made in the Convention between newly independent and other successor States is important because different consequences flow from it. While the 'clean slate' rule applies to newly independent States, the principle of continuity of treaty obligations applies to other successor States. This dramatic difference in legal effect makes the definition of a newly independent State critically important. It raises the question whether there should not be room for 'quasi-newly independent States' which would include States emerging outside a colonial context but in circumstances resembling the emergence of a newly independent State.
The International Law Commission in its proposals to the Vienna Conference, had proposed precisely such a category. It suggested that a territory which would become a State 'in circumstances which are essentially of the same character as those existing in the case of the formation of a newly independent State' would also be treated as a newly independent State for the purposes of the Convention.
7 What the BLC was thinking of here were cases such as the separation of East and West Pakistan from India.
8 This proposal was rejected by the Conference at the initiative of France and Switzerland.
9 What precisely these two States intended is obscure but the apparent reason why many delegations supported their amendment was that they did not wish to encourage secession.
10 However, as Sinclair pointed out prophetically, the rejection of the ILC proposal by the Conference was unlikely to inhibit a quasi-newly independent State from insisting that it be given the benefit of the clean slate rule.
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The Convention has so far failed to attract the IS adherences it requires to enter into force. Significantly, no Western State has until now become a party. In 1990 the Dutch Government proposed to Parliament that the Netherlands should adhere, in order to contribute to the codification of the rules contained in the Convention.
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However, this attempt was officially abandoned four years later when the Government suddenly announced that it had concluded that the Convention's rules were not an accurate reflection of customary international law. 13 The Dutch view was that recent State practice showed a clean slate approach in respect of all new States, not merely in respect of newly independent ones. 14 Austria, among others, has also 
III. The Special Character of Human Rights Treaties
More than 40 years ago, Wilfred Jenks made a powerful plea in favour of the argument that there can be no clean slate in respect of multilateral treaties of a legislative or universal character. In his view, this applied in particular to international instruments, such as the international labour conventions, which have the effect of vesting rights in individuals or organizations.
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It is indeed difficult to see on what legal basis beneficiaries of human rights granted to them under a treaty could be deprived of these rights simply because they have ended up under the jurisdiction of a successor state. One indication of the irreversible character of human rights obligations is that human rights treaties do not contain termination clauses. With very few exceptions (Greece's temporary withdrawal from the European Convention on Human Rights between 1969 and 1974), no state has ever terminated a human rights treaty, even after a radical change of government. When in 1979 the regime of Ayatollah Khomeini replaced mat of the Shah of Iran the new Government did not terminate any of the human rights treaties to which Iran had been a party, including the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Additional evidence of the special character of the rights granted under human rights treaties may be found in Article 60(5) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which provides that provisions relating to the protection of the human person contained in treaties of a humanitarian character may not be terminated or suspended in response to a breach by another party.
From the point of view of legal theory, the notion that rights granted under human rights treaties are not affected by state succession may be based on the doctrine of acquired rights, as applied by the Permanent Court of International Justice in the German Settlers case. In that case, the Court found that private rights, including property rights, could be validly invoked against the successor state. 18 As a matter of fact, private rights may consist not only of property rights but also of claims against other individuals and claims against the state. In this day and age, the most important category of rights that may be invoked against the state consists of basic human rights and fundamental freedoms deriving from both customary and treaty law (including, but certainly not limited to, the right to own property). The doctrine of acquired rights therefore applies a fortiori with respect to human rights.
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It is true that the view that obligations contained in human rights treaties, or more generally obligations contained in law-making treaties, continue to bind the successor state did not prevail in the Vienna Convention. The International Law Commission considered the idea but ultimately decided that the time was not yet ripe for it, and therefore did not include it in the draft it submitted to the Vienna Conference. 20 According to the Convention, the only category of treaties not affected by state succession are treaties establishing boundaries and other territorial regimes. 21 However, as will be demonstrated below, state practice during the 1990s has vindicated Jenks and his school of thought.
IV. The Attitude of the International Community
The international community has an obvious interest in the continuity of obligations contained in human rights treaties. After all, non-respect for human rights in a successor state may result in tensions and refugee flows which may even endanger international peace and security. It is therefore not surprising that continuity of obligations under human rights treaties has been insisted upon by both political organs of international organizations and by treaty monitoring bodies.
The most successful operation to ensure continuity of treaty obligations concluded under its auspices has been conducted by the International Labour Organisation (ILO). Under the leadership of Jenks, it began to insist that, as a condition of membership of the organization, a new state had to declare itself bound by the ILO treaties to which its parent state had been a party. This strategy is reported to have achieved excellent results.
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The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has also long taken the view that a successor state is automatically bound by the international humanitarian instruments that were binding on the predecessor state, unless the successor state has made a specific declaration to the contrary. In practice, however, the ICRC has en- couraged successor States to formally confirm their adherence to these instruments and, where successor States insisted upon acceding rather than succeeding to the Geneva Conventions and their Protocols, the ICRC has not objected.
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Unlike the ILO, the United Nations has never insisted on a declaration of continuity of treaty obligations as a condition for membership of the organization. In recent years, however, its organs have started to become more active on the subject. The UN Commission on Human Rights has in successive resolutions emphasized the special nature of international human rights treaties and it has called on successor States to confirm to appropriate depositaries that they continue to be bound by obligations under international human rights treaties. 24 In these resolutions the Commission also requested human rights treaty bodies to consider further the continuing applicability of international human rights treaties to successor States. The first of these resolutions even considered that 'as successor States they shall succeed to international human rights treaties' [emphasis added]. The broad support for these resolutions appears from the fact that they were all adopted without a vote.
Not surprisingly in view of the role that has been assigned to them, UN treaty monitoring bodies have made more specific statements than this, although some have been more active on the issue of State succession than others. Most significantly, in September 1994, the 5th meeting of persons chairing UN human rights treaty bodies pointed out 'that successor States were automatically bound by obligations under international human rights instruments from the respective date of independence and that observance of the obligations should not depend on a declaration of confirmation made by the Government of the successor State.'
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Of the various treaty monitoring bodies, the Human Rights Committee, set up under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, has been the most outspoken on the issue of State succession. At its session in March/April 1993, it declared 'that all the peoples within the territory of a former State party to the Covenant remained entitled to the guarantees of the Covenant, and that, in particular, Armenia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan were bound by the obligations of the Covenant as from the dates of their independence.' The Committee pointed out that reports under Article 40 of the Covenant accordingly became due one year after these dates and it requested that such reports be submitted to it. 26 On 7 October 1992, the Committee had adopted a similar decision with regard to BosniaHerzegovina, Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. 27 The results of this policy were fairly positive. At the time of writing, all States succeeding to the for- 29 Human rights treaties were among me first UN treaties to which the Czech Republic and Slovakia confirmed dieir continuing adherence by virtue of State succession.
The eagerness of the two successor States to ensure continuity of Czechoslovakia's obligations under the European Convention on Human Rights was also noteworthy. The CSSR had been a party to mat Convention since 18 March 1992. According to Article 66 of the Convention, only members of the Council of Europe may become parties to it. Therefore, the Czech Republic and the Slovakia Republic could only succeed to the obligations of the predecessor State after they had first become members of the Council of Europe. This difficulty was solved pragmatically, however. On 30 June 1993 me Council of Europe's Committee of Ministers admitted the two States as members. At the same time the Committee decided that, in accordance with their expressed wishes, the two States were to be regarded as succeeding to the Convention retroactively, with effect from 1 January 1993.
30 Although the decision might have been worded more elegantly, 31 the episode constitutes clear evidence of the strong desire on all sides to ensure seamless continuity of obligations in the field of human rights.
Since the CSSR had accepted the right of individual petition under Article 25 of the Convention, individual complaints against violations committed during the pe- This line of action has been criticised as being inconsistent with the criteria for membership applied by the United Nations vis-a-vis India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Russia. 40 Be that as it may, the attitude adopted by the international community has created considerable uncertainty with regard to the obligations of the FRY under the human rights treaties to which the SFRY had been a party. The UN SecretaryGeneral continues to list 'Yugoslavia' as a party to the human rights treaties to which the SFRY was a party. The practice of human rights treaty monitoring bodies has been somewhat ambivalent. The Human Rights Committee, for example, in its reports lists 'Yugoslavia' as a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and it indicates when 'Yugoslavia's' next report is due. However, when in 1993 the representatives of the FRY came to present their country's report to the Committee, they were listed as representing the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro).
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Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Slovenia have argued that the FRY cannot be regarded as a party to treaties such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination and the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women. They base this conclusion on the argument that, on the one hand, the FRY cannot automatically continue the legal personality of the SFRY and, on the other hand, the FRY has refused to formally succeed to these treaties. 42 Because this approach has prevailed at meetings of States parties of these treaties the FRY has been barred from attending them. This has occurred in spite of advice by the UN Legal Counsel that the General Assembly resolution had not deprived the FRY of its right to participate in the work of organs other than Assembly bodies. 43 The exclusion of the FRY from meetings of States parties to human rights conventions raises questions about its status with respect to these conventions. Western representatives have stressed that, in spite of its exclusion, the FRY continues to be bound by the obligations arising from these conventions on the grounds that it is one of the successor States to the SFRY. 44 The FRY has repeatedly declared itself ready to honour its obligations but it has warned that the result of the denial of its right of participation in meetings of States parties could be that it is no longer obliged to do so. 45 It subsequently began to carry out this threat when it informed the Human Rights Committee that as long as it was denied its right to participate in the meetings of States parties to the Covenant, it would refuse to submit its fourth periodic report. 46 The Committee has expressed its regret at this decision and it has confirmed that it continues to regard the FRY as having succeeded to the obligations undertaken by the SFRY. 47 From the point of view of the international protection of human rights this quarrel is most unfortunate. All concerned agree that the FRY has succeeded or should have succeeded to the human rights treaty obligations undertaken by the SFRY. The difference of opinion is about the manner in which the succession should have occurred: as a result of dismemberment or as a result of secession. By requesting the FRY to submit its fourth rather than its initial periodic report (as it did in the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia and Macedonia) the Human Rights Committee has accepted that we are dealing here with a case of secession in which the FRY is the continuation of the legal personality of the SFRY. The other States parties would have been wise to tacitly accept this ruling if only because it makes it absolutely clear that the FRY may be held accountable for any violations of the Covenant committed by the SFRY. By refusing to accept the attitude adopted by the Human Rights Committee, the other parties have provided the FRY with excellent grounds on which to dodge international scrutiny of its human rights record.
Paradoxically, in its application against the FRY which is currently pending before the International Court of Justice, Bosnia-Herzegovina argued that die jurisdiction of the Court could be based on Article DC of the Genocide Convention.
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The Court apparently did not hesitate to rely on this provision for the indication of provisional measures. It simply noted that the SFRY had been a party to the Genocide Convention and that on 27 April 1992 the FRY had officially informed the UN Secretary-General that, as the continuation of the legal personality of the SFRY, it would honour the international treaties of me former Yugoslavia. 49 The Bosnian attitude smacks of bad faith or at least of serious inconsistency. It would appear that as a result of the attitude it adopted in this case, Bosnia-Herzegovina is now estopped from again putting forward the claim that the FRY cannot be regarded as a party to the Genocide Convention and to other human rights treaties adhered to by the SFRY. fails to recognize that human rights treaties enjoy a special character which is different from other treaties. In particular, the assumption of the Baltic States that they are not bound by treaties in which rights had been granted to people within their territories seems questionable. 56 The Baltic attitude is also problematic because it causes uncertainties with respect to accountability for violations occurring before their accession to these treaties.
The fourth and largest category consists of Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. This group presents the least coherent picture with regard to treaty succession. No doubt actively encouraged by the ICRC, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan have succeeded to the Geneva Conventions and Protocols. 57 There has been a similar willingness on the part of these States to continue to be bound by the ILO conventions to which the USSR had been a party.
58 Again, this willingness is no doubt attributable to the active role played by the International Labour Office.
However, the performance of this group of States with regard to the principal human rights treaties is less encouraging. None of them has succeeded to a human rights treaty. Several have acceded to these treaties and some have simply failed to clarify their position at all. As in the case of the Baltic States, the apparent preference of these States for accession rather than succession to human rights treaties to which the USSR had been a party is disappointing. As the Human Rights Committee pointed out rather mildly when considering the first report by Azerbaijan after its accession to the Covenant: it would have been 'more correct' for Azerbaijan to have regarded itself as succeeding to the obligations of the Covenant. 59 More disturbing, however, is the absence of action by some of the States in this group. At the time of writing, more than four years after having gained their independence, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan had still not indicated their position with regard to the International Covenants on Human Rights. At the same time, none of these States had indicated that they did not regard themselves bound by these treaties. While this lack of clarity may be blamed on shortage of resources and lack of legal expertise rather than anything else, it is not indicative of high priority for international human rights commitments.
D. Hong Kong
An interesting experiment in State succession in respect of human rights treaties will commence on 1 July 1997 when the People's Republic of China will resume sover- 
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These are remarkable provisions because China is not currently a party to most of these treaties and in accordance with the principle of moving treaty-frontiers one would have assumed that these treaties would cease to be in force in respect of Hong Kong after the transfer of sovereignty.
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The fact that the two States nevertheless specifically agreed to ensure continuity of the applicability of the two Covenants and the international labour conventions must be regarded as clear support for the proposition that entitlements in the field of human rights are inalienable and not affected by transfers of sovereignty. Under the doctrine of acquired rights, the population of Hong Kong could not be deprived of the protection of the human rights provisions it presently enjoys. However, from the perspective of the people of Hong Kong it is obviously preferable to have the continuity of obligations enshrined in a treaty between the predecessor and the successor State. China's acceptance of this principle appears all the more significant because it has not exactly established a reputation as a champion of the international protection of human rights. The wide support for the continuity of obligations under human rights treaties is not surprising in view of the interests which are at stake. Persons within the jurisdiction of the territory have an obvious interest in the continuation of the rights to which they were entitled under the predecessor State. Third States similarly have an obvious interest in the continuing applicability of human rights treaties. Apart from their immaterial interests in such treaties, they are keenly aware that discontinuity of human rights obligations may give rise to international tensions. Their interest in stability is comparable to the one which underlies the principle that treaties establishing territorial regimes are not affected by State succession. But even from the point of view of the successor State, discontinuity of obligations under human rights treaties may not appear particularly necessary or desirable. In view of the broad international consensus on which most of these treaties are based, it is unlikely that a new State will regard such treaties as 'political' instruments that are too closely linked to the predecessor State. The reporting obligations contained in human rights treaties may be perceived as the kind of administrative burden the new State would prefer to do without. However, international supervisory bodies have rightly been flexible on deadlines when States are demonstrably unable to meet this obligation.
As long as it is assumed that successor States in any case continue to be bound by the obligations of all treaties to which the predecessor State was a party, these findings may seem superfluous. However, in view of the doubts that have been expressed about the validity of the general principle of continuity of treaty obligations reflected in Article 34 of the Vienna Convention, it becomes necessary to highlight the special character of human rights treaties. If it were decided that the Vienna Convention needs to be revised because it does not adequately reflect customary international law, the research conducted in preparation for this article suggests that any new codification should contain a specific provision that a succession of States does not effect obligations arising from human rights treaties.
